Сумісність у податковій звітності by Lipatov, Vilen
ISSN 2519-8564 (рrint), ISSN 2523-451X (online). European Journal of Management Issues. – 2017. – 25 (2) 
European Journal 
 of Management Issues 
Volume 25 (2), 2017, pp. 92-102  
 
DOI: 10.15421/191713 
 
Received: 19 April 2017 
Revised: 30 April 2017; 29 May 2017 
Accepted: 20 June 2017 
Published: 25 June 2017 
 
 
UDC classification: 330.1, 330.8, 330.3  
JEL classification: H26, H32  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Purpose – to describe a compliance-monitoring equilibrium in presence of compatibility costs in a setting when managers and other parties 
have different attitude towards compliance. 
Design/Method/Approach. Classical game theory – Nash equilibrium. 
Findings. If compatibility costs are small, there exist a unique stable Nash equilibrium of the game between the tax authority and a population 
of heterogeneous firms. In this equilibrium, the relation between compatibility costs and compliance is non-monotonic and depends on the 
curvature of auditing function. However, compatibility costs reduce non-compliance in low cheating regimes and may enhance it when 
many firms are cheating. 
Limitations. The model is at high level of abstraction and neglects many important detail that characterize each field where it could be 
potentially applied. 
Theoretical implications. The results provide one rationale for developing countries to be cautious with employing refined auditing schemes 
and for developed countries to promote complicated accounting procedures. 
Originality/value. Compatibility costs are not previously considered 
in economic analysis of compliance. 
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Сумісність у податковій звітності  
 
Вілен Ліпатов‡ 
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Брюссель, Бельгія 
 
Мета дослідження – описати рівновагу у відносинах контролю 
за дотриманням встановлених вимог (compliance) при 
наявності витрат на сумісність (compatibility costs) в 
умовах, при яких менеджер і інші сторони відносин мають 
різні підходи до встановлених вимог. 
Дизайн/Метод/Підхід дослідження. Класична теорія ігор – 
рівновага Неша (Nash equilibrium). 
Результати дослідження. Виявлено, що якщо витрати на 
сумісність є невеликими, то існує унікальна рівновага Неша 
в грі між податковими органами і популяцією гетерогенних 
фірм. В даній рівновазі відношення між витратами на 
сумісність і відповідність встановленим вимогам є 
немонотонним і залежить від кривизни функції аудиту. 
Проте витрати на сумісність знижують невідповідність 
встановленим вимогам (non-compliance) в умовах 
низького рівня обману (low cheating regimes) і збільшують 
цю невідповідність при залученні великої кількості фірм в 
обманні дії. 
Обмеження дослідження. Дана модель заснована на високому 
рівні абстракції і нехтує багатьма важливими деталями, які 
притаманні можливим сферам практичного застосування. 
Практичне значення дослідження: Результати пропонують 
логічне обґрунтування для країн, що розвиваються, при 
прийнятті адаптованих схем аудиту, а для розвинених 
країн для впровадження більш складних процедур аудиту. 
Оригінальність/Цінність/Наукова новизна дослідження. 
Витрати на сумісність раніше не використовувалися в 
економічному аналізі встановлених вимог. 
 
Тип статті – теоретична. 
 
Ключові слова: ухилення від податків; сумісність; координація; 
бізнес-партенрство; оподаткування. 
 
Совместимость в налоговой отчетности 
 
Вилен Липатов‡ 
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Цель исследования – описать равновесие в отношениях 
контроля за соблюдением установленных требований 
(compliance) при наличии затрат на совместимость 
(compatibility costs) в условиях, при которых менеджер и 
другие стороны отношений имеют различные подходы к 
установленным требованиям. 
Дизайн/Метод/Подход исследования. Классическая теория игр 
– равновесие Нэша (Nash equilibrium). 
Результаты исследования. Выявлено, что если затраты на 
совместимость невелики, то существует уникальное 
равновесие Нэша в игре между налоговыми органами и 
популяцией гетерогенных фирм. В данном равновесии 
отношение между затратами на совместимость и 
соответствием установленням требованием является 
немонотонным и зависит от кривизны функции аудита. Тем 
не менее, затраты на совместимость снижают 
несоответствие установленным требованиям (non-
compliance) в условиях низкого уровня обмана (low 
cheating regimes) и увеличивают это несоответствие при 
вовлечении множества фирм в обманные действия. 
Ограничения исследования. Данная модель основана на 
высоком уровне абстракции и пренебрегает многими 
важными деталями, которые свойственны возможным 
сферам практического применения. 
Практическое значение исследования. Результаты предлагают 
логическое обоснование для развивающихся стран при 
принятии адаптированных схем аудита, а для развитых 
стран для внедрения более сложных процедур аудита. 
Оригинальность/Ценность/Научная новизна исследования. 
Затраты на совместимость ранее не использовались 
в экономическом анализе установленных требований. 
 
Тип статьи – теоретическая. 
 
Ключевые слова: уклонение от налогов; совместимость; 
координация; бизнес-партенрство; налогообложение. 
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Introduction 
anagers of varying levels in hierarchy throughout the world 
face a dilemma whether to comply with various standards. 
Firms as represented by their managers add new dimensions 
to the problem over and above standard gambling and cat-and-
mouse1 approaches. Firstly, a firm is not a single decision maker 
and has its own agency problem, as stressed by Crocker and 
Slemrod (2005). Second, the interaction between firms can be 
important for the general outcome, as Bayer and Cowell (2009) 
and Sanchez (2006) point out, although Lipatov (2008) shows 
that the interaction matters in games with individual taxpayers as 
well. 
Even in the simplest cases, successful hiding of information from a 
monitoring authority requires coordinated action whenever two 
or more parties involved in a transaction. For example, in 
sophisticated tax avoidance and evasion (tax evasion that 
requires certain expertise and involves intricate manipulation of 
accounts), there may be multiple parties as well as substantial 
costs of making accounts consistent and looking good at 
superficial checks of tax authorities. In the US, Sarbanes-Oxley act 
of 20022 has made these costs even higher3. 
The other aspect of costs to coordinate are differences in the 
reports about the monitored activity that should be similar a 
priory. In case of tax reports of transacting firms, the tax 
authority observes transactions and can audit both partners, 
having some idea of how correlated their incomes are. It is well 
known in the profession that the tax audits are not random. First, 
the taxpayers are divided in homogenous auditing classes. 
Second, within each class the tax authority may receive some 
signals that a given report is suspicious. One of such signals is a 
discrepancy in the reports of business partners. The importance 
of coordination in tax reporting is also confirmed experimentally 
by Alm and McKee (2004). 
The counter-checking of reports is a standard procedure for some 
taxes. For VAT, this particularly makes sense, as a part of the tax 
that is paid by one party is then rebated by the other. Das-Gupta 
and Gang (2001) model the matching of purchase and sales 
invoices explicitly. They conclude that cross-matching can induce 
truthful reporting, but distorts purchase and sales decisions. In 
Russia the auditing of one firm involves checking accounts of the 
firms that are transacting with it, as described e. g. in Sumina 
(2006). 
McIntyre (2005) writes that most of the modern sheltering 
schemes undermine the basic principle of tax law: a tax 
deductible item of one taxpayer is a part of taxable income of the 
other. The evasion opportunity arises when one firm deducts 
some payments made to the other firm, but this other firm is not 
taxable, e. g. it is an off-shore company. This kind of evasion looks 
simple in principle, but requires sophisticated organization and 
coordination not to be obvious. In turn, the detection of such 
evasion requires counter-checking of the reports provided by 
business partners. In Russia, the mechanism of evasion is similar, 
though the schemes are usually blunter: the accounting specialists 
register a lot of fictitious firms some of which just do not pay 
taxes and disappear. 
We look here at a long run situation in an economy where firms 
exercise transactions with each other. Before entering the 
industry, a firm has to decide whether to adopt aggressive 
attitude towards tax reporting or to stay on the compliant side. 
This choice of accounting standard is analogous to the choice of a 
                                           
1 The term is borrowed from Cowell (2006) and refers to the modeling of 
evasion as a game between tax agency and a single taxpayer. 
2 The following information about the act is taken from 
http://www.fmsinc.org/cms/?pid=3253. 
3 The data availability requirements that are also part of costs can be 
checked at http://www.itcinstitute.com/display.aspx?id=2021. 
computer operating system in its compatibility aspect. That is, 
while operating together, the firms with different accounting 
machineries incur higher transaction costs than the firms with 
similar accounting procedures do. 
If a firm decides to be aggressive, it hires a tax evasion specialist 
who arranges accounts for a certain fee4. A compliant firm 
manages accounts itself. After the accounting policy has been 
adopted, the firms start operating and transacting with other 
firms. Finally, the firms get profits and report them to a tax 
authority. The tax authority observes the transacting firms and 
decides on the auditing intensity. 
Thus, in our economy the firms face two kinds of costs in addition 
to standard costs and benefits of evasion. The first type is 
compatibility costs, which have to be borne every time there is a 
transaction between firms with different accounting standards. 
These are related to the adjustment of accounts for different 
kinds of firms: e. g., the aggressive and complying firms often 
prefer transactions to be reflected in the books at different time 
points or at different locations5. The second type is endogenous 
costs, which arise every time the tax authority sets unequal 
probability of auditing for the cases of observing similar and 
different reports of the two firms whose income is known to be 
correlated. 
The endogenous costs are also present in Sanchez (2006). The 
difference of his paper from our approach is not only in the lack of 
compatibility costs, but also that he considers tax authority with 
ability to commit. This is well explained by different ideas 
underlying the two papers: whereas we consider long-run 
equilibrium, Sanchez concentrates on the short-term with the aim 
of constructing auditing rule that minimizes mistakes of the tax 
authority (in sense of auditing the honest and not auditing 
cheaters). Furthermore, whereas Sanchez describes the situation 
in a homogenous auditing class, assuming perfect correlation of 
income and uncertainty about the auditing rule, we consider a 
pair of firms with imperfectly correlated income. 
The paper by Bayer and Cowell (2009) stands even further from 
us: it looks at the effect of auditing on joint decision of competing 
firms to evade and to produce. Though their main result, the 
desirability of non-fixed auditing rule, survives in our setup, we 
consider firms that are partners rather than competitors, and we 
focus on the effect of compatibility costs rather than auditing 
rules. Crocker and Slemrod (2005) go inside a firm, whereas we 
treat it as a decision making unit. 
In our model, the tax authority has no ability to commit. Firstly, 
this has a natural appeal for the long run modeling. Secondly, 
though the auditing rules are often announced by the tax 
authorities, there is no means to establish whether they are 
actually followed. 
The main result of the paper is equilibrium characterization: We 
find out that equilibrium cheating and auditing differ substantially 
from the approach disregarding transactions among the firms, 
even if the compatibility the share of cheating firms as well as the 
auditing probability is costs are small. When evasion is small, likely 
to be overestimated, if the coordination of tax reports is not 
taken into account. In case of popular misreporting, both the 
share of non-compliers and the auditing probability may be 
underestimated. It is worth noting that the auditing probability in 
our setting varies with the reports combination, making 
comparison with uniform auditing probability of the 
representative case difficult in principle. 
In general, we identify three effects that a change in compliance 
share has on attractiveness of aggressive accounting: positive “ 
                                           
4 We treat the specialist as a passive player here. Her optimization problem 
is analysed in Lipatov (2008). 
5 A list of common tax shelters can be found at 
http://www.lowtax.net/lowtax/html/offon/usa_new/usashelt.html. 
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differential probability”  and “ saving”  effects and negative “ 
auditing change”  effect. The positive effects reflect benefits from 
being compatible with more of the potential partners; the 
negative effect comes from strategic reaction of the monitoring 
authority. The total effect of any parameter on the endogenous 
variables is then influenced by the sum of the three effects 
identified. 
For a large class of auditing technologies, we find that 
compatibility costs decrease cheating and auditing when only few 
firms are underreporting and increase them in case evasion is 
popular. The correlation of profits has a similar effect. In both 
instances, with coordination cost ascent the more popular 
strategy becomes more attractive; hence more firms choose it in 
equilibrium. Somewhat surprisingly, but following exactly the 
same logic, improvement in auditing technology and fines reduce 
cheating in low evasion regimes and enhance it in high evasion 
regimes. 
The auditing probability in our model can be positively affected by 
the amount of fines, unlike in representative case. This becomes 
possible because the direct effect of larger fines to make auditing 
more attractive may overplay the indirect effect coming through 
the reduced cheating. Finally, the effectiveness of fine always 
decreases as a result of an increase in compatibility costs. 
We also shed some light on the mechanism of evasion game when 
compatibility matters: we show that correlation of profits solely 
generates the difference in auditing probabilities. The 
compatibility costs alone change equilibrium cheating and 
auditing, but leave the latter independent from the report 
configuration. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model setup is 
presented in the next section, followed by the description of 
equilibrium structure. Section four is devoted to the discussion of 
the results for the mixed equilibrium. Conclusion is followed by 
appendix with derivations of equilibria and results. 
Intended contribution 
he research aims at characterizing equilibrium outcomes 
when firms’ management follows an optimal strategy of 
compliance with respect to some regulated activity (e.g. tax 
compliance, labor protection compliance, environmental 
compliance). In particular, the optimal strategy takes into account 
the effect of the actions of the other firms’ managers actions on 
the profits of the firm. This research question is answered using 
the tools of classical game theory, i.e Nash equilibrium in mixed 
strategies. 
Compliance game 
Single firm benchmark 
et us start with the case when there are no transacting pairs 
and no compatibility costs. A single firm decides whether to 
evade its profit, facing the tax authority that can perform 
auditing. We use the approach of Graez, Reinganum and Wilde 
(1986) in this benchmark, with a convex rather than linear cost 
function for auditing. 
First, the nature moves, assigning a type to the firms: high profit 
=h  or low profit 0=l . The types are drawn from a 
distribution characterized by a density function  
  .
0= if1
= if
=



 x
x
xf


 
Second, the high profit firms decide whether to submit a high 
report =H  (be honest) or a low report 0=L  (cheat). 
The tax authority does not audit high reports and exerts effort a  
in auditing low reports. A continuous function    Ra 0,1:  is a 
mapping from detection probability defined on the unit interval to 
the auditing effort defined for non-negative real numbers. The 
inverse function determines detection probability from the effort 
 0,1: Rp . We assume that the firms can never be 
detected with certainty, and zero effort results in zero detection 
probability   0=0p . The low report is honest with probability 


q

1
1
 and not with the complementary probability, where q  
is the probability that high profit firm is cheating. 
The authority is maximizing its expected revenue 
   atsap
q
q





1
1 , the high income firm - its expected 
profit     tsap  1 . Here s  is a surcharge rate for being 
caught, t  is a tax rate. In equilibrium with positive detection 
probability FOC for the tax authority 
   11=1 





q
tsap'
, 
and indifferent condition for the firm is . Hence equilibrium effort 
is  
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s
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and equilibrium evasion probability is  
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Sufficient conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium: p  
is strictly increasing and strictly concave, 
   tss
pp'















1
1
>
1
11
. The latter actually ensures mixed 
equilibrium. If, to the contrary, detection probability does not 
increase fast enough or the fine is too small, the equilibrium is all 
cheating. The equilibrium, either in mixed or pure strategies, is 
unique with strictly increasing and strictly convex p . We retain 
this assumption for the rest of the paper. The mixed equilibrium is 
of most interest to us, since we do not observe full cheating and 
the fines are usually high enough to cover auditing costs in reality. 
Moreover, this mixed equilibrium is evolutionary stable (Weibull 
1995), as even if a small part of taxpayers gives honest reports, 
the reduction in detection probability is not enough to off-set a 
loss from lower evasion. 
Two transacting firms 
ecall the story behind our model, presented in the 
introduction. Firstly, the firms choose their accounting 
standards. Second, the firms are matched according to some 
rule. Third, the firms draw pre-tax incomes from participating in a 
match. The second and third stages may repeat a number of 
times. Fourth, the firms summarize the realized income and 
submit a tax report. Finally, the tax authority audits the tax 
reports of some firms (and all its partners). 
To make the analysis as simple as possible while preserving the 
coordination aspect, we make the following simplifying 
assumptions: (i) each firm meets only one transacting partner; (ii) 
each firm makes only one transaction; (iii) the aggressive firm 
does not report truthfully. Under these assumptions the game 
above is equivalent to the following 3 player game. 
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The setup 
onsider a simultaneous game between two risk neutral firms 
and a tax authority. 
The first move is made by the firms. They decide whether to 
adopt aggressive accounting policy and pay a price b  per evaded 
euro for it, tb <0  , or to use compliant accounting that comes 
at a cost normalized to zero. 
The second move is made by the nature that assigns a type to 
each of the two firms: high profit =h  or low profit 0=l . We 
assume now that the profits are correlated with the correlation 
coefficient 1<,0 rr  6. We do not consider negative correlation, 
as our firms are cooperating rather than competing. The joint 
distribution of two types in a match is given by the following 
density function: 
     







0.== if,21
,0,=,if,
,== if,
=,
yx
yx
yx
yxf



 
where 
    ,,1:= 22  r
. 
After the pre-tax profit is realized, the firms submit their reports 
according to the procedure they chose in the first stage. Namely, 
the low income firm submits a low report and gets a payoff 
normalized to 0 , if its partner has the same accounting standard, 
and c , if it has a different standard. The high income firm 
submits a high report =H  (be honest) if chose compliant 
policy or a low report 0=L  (cheat) if chose aggressive policy. 
Each firm of type h  (high profit) gets ex interim expected payoff 
(before the coordination costs c ) of  jiu , , where i  is its own 
report and 
j
 is a report of its partner:  
    
    
     .1=,=,
,1=,
,1=,
tLHuHHu
btsapHLu
btsapLLu
HL
LL






 
Ex ante expected profit is then the following. If a firm decides to 
use aggressive accounting,  
 
 
Here the event when both the firm and its partner get high profit 
defines the first term, the event when the firm gets high profit 
and its partner gets a low one defines the second term. The third 
term contains the payoff in the event of our firm getting low 
profit, normalized to zero. In any event we have to subtract 
coordination cost c  in case our aggressive firm is matched with 
the compliant one, and that is what the last term takes care of. 
                                           
6 We have also analyzed the case when r = 1, but since this is not likely to 
happen in reality, we do not present the results here. It turns out that the 
equilibrium structure in this case is distinctly different from correlation 
arbitrary close to perfect, so we also cannot use it as a benchmark. The 
derivation of equilibrium is available upon request. 
If a firm decides to use compliant accounting, it is  
               .01,,1,= qcLHuHHuqLHquCu  
 
The terms are similar: both firms getting high profit, only the 
compliant firm getting high profit, and the compliant firm getting 
low profit. 
The third move is by the tax authority, which chooses an auditing 
effort Ra  conditional on the reports observed:  LLa  (two low 
reports),  HLa  (a low and a high report in any order),  HHa  
(two high reports). The tax authority gets expected revenue of 
   atsap  1  from each cheater it audits and the revenue at   
from each honest report it audits. 
The game takes into account both types of costs outlined in the 
introduction. Compatibility costs are fixed to c  per transaction. 
The endogenous coordination cost reflects the difference in 
detection probabilities the tax authority might want to generate. 
Namely, the authority can exert different efforts in auditing low 
profit report depending on whether it comes with another low 
report or with a high report. Compared to the case of two low 
reports, it needs a half of resources to provide the same auditing 
probability if one of the reports is high. Thus, we do not consider 
the case in which coordinated evasion requires more effort to 
discover than uncoordinated does. 
We choose the simultaneous formulation rather than a sequential 
one, because we do not want to consider a particular industry 
structure or a relation between an entrant and an incumbent. Our 
goal is to characterize the economy where two firms from 
different populations (again, think of buyers and sellers) meet to 
play a coordination game. Even more, since the decisions are long-
term, they become a property of the firms, so that they can be 
characterized as evaders or honest. In this way, the Nash 
equilibria of the simultaneous game show us where these 
populations could converge to. 
Optimization problem of the tax authority 
he tax authority observes the match. Recall that we denote 
with lower-case letters the profits, and with upper-case the 
reports. We have then the following profit - report table 
which represents the measures (or shares) of taxpayer pairs 
reporting incomes given by the column entries, while actually 
receiving incomes given by row entries. 
Table 1  
Profit – report table 
 total HH HL LL 
hh    21 q   qq 12  2q  
hl   2  0    q 12     q2  
ll   21  0 0   21  
 
                 .101,,1,= cqLLuHLuqLLquAu  
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Table 2  
A breakdown of the compatibility costs propagation mechanism 
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The following lemma characterizes the best response of the tax 
authority in this case. 
Lemma 1 In the tax evasion game above the best response of the 
tax authority  qa  to the firms cheating with probability  0,1q  
is implicitly defined by:  
0,=HHa                                                                                                          (1) 
  
 
; if,
1
= 0HL
HL' qq
tsq
q
qap 



                                                        (2) 
    
   
; if,
1
212
= 0
2
2
LL
LL' qq
tsqq
qq
qap 



              (3) 
    .< if0,=;<if0,= 00 LL
LL
HL
HL qqqaqqqa                             (4) 
The proof is left to the appendix A, 
0
HLq  and 
0
LLq  are also defined 
there. Obviously, observing two high reports the tax authority 
does not audit them. Observing different reports in a match, the 
authority audits the low one with probability determined by the 
effort  qa
HL
. When two low reports are observed, the optimal 
auditing effort is given by  qa
HL
. 
Note that the two efforts (and corresponding probabilities) are 
only equal, when 0=r , that is the report of one firm does not 
contain any information about the profit of the other firm. With 
0>r  we have    qaqa
LLHL  , which is quite intuitive: different 
reports indicate possible cheating, so it makes sense to audit 
them more. 
Equilibria 
efore stating the result it is useful to introduce the following 
terminology: 
We call an equilibrium of our game full cheating, if all the 
firms are submitting low (zero) reports in this equilibrium 1=
q ; 
we call an equilibrium full honesty, if all the high income firms 
submit high reports 0=
q .  
The proposition 1 characterizes the equilibria arising in case of 
correlated draws. We denote the equilibrium values of cheating 
probability with 
q  and of auditing effort with 
a . 
In the tax evasion game with two transacting firms  
(i) there exists a symmetric evolutionary stable equilibrium with 
q  implicitly defined by  
         
            ,11
1=21


tsqapq
qapqcqbt
HL
LL




 (5) 
0=HHa , 
  qaa HLHL =
, 
  qaa LLLL =
 as given by (1), if the 
compatibility costs are small and  
          ,11>21 000  tsqapqcqbt LLHLLLLL             (6) 
where 
0
LLq  reflects auditing technology and is defined in the 
appendix. 
 (ii) There exists a symmetric evolutionary stable equilibrium with 
q  implicitly defined by  
          ,11=21  tsqapqcqbt HL                         (7) 
0=HHa ,  
 qaa HLHL = , 0=
LLa , if the compatibility costs are 
small and (6) does not hold7. 
 (iii) If   0 cbt  , there exist a full honesty equilibrium with 
00,=  aq . 
 (iv) If        tsapcbt
LL  11 , there exist a full 
cheating equilibrium, and 0=1,=
 HHaq ,  1=
HLHL aa  , 
 1= LLLL aa  .  
 
The proof of the proposition is left to appendix B. The structure of 
equilibria is very intuitive: for small compatibility costs (how small 
they should be depends on the auditing technology) there is a 
unique stable mixed equilibrium, as in a standard game without 
coordination issues. A small qualification here is that it takes a 
different form depending on whether consistent low reports are 
audited (i) or not (ii). 
With larger compatibility costs, multiple equilibria may arise. More 
importantly, full honesty and full cheating may become 
equilibrium, as with everybody around being honest it is too 
costly in terms of compatibility to use aggressive accounting and 
visa versa. Whereas only the magnitude of the compatibility costs 
(relative to the evasion benefits) decides whether there exist full 
honesty equilibrium (iii), the auditing technology also plays a role 
in determining the existence of full cheating equilibrium (iv). 
Discussion of results 
Summary 
ince we believe that the exogenous coordination costs are 
relatively small, we can concentrate on the regions of 
parameter values where a mixed equilibrium exists. As it has 
been already noted, the probability of auditing for dissonant 
reports is higher than that for the similar reports as long as 
0>r . A further breakdown of the compatibility costs 
propagation mechanism is represented in the table below: 
                                           
7 The equilibria characterized in (i) and (ii) are also unique under the 
conditions specified in the appendix B. 
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From this table we see clearly that the differential auditing 
probability is generated from some correlation even in the 
absence of exogenous compatibility costs. On the other hand, 
only exogenous costs c  shift equilibrium cheating probability 
even in the absence of auditing intensity differential: The 
following expression determines the share of aggressive firms 
with independent draws.  
   
 
  .1
1
1
=21 1 


 ts
tsq
q
ppcqbt ' 



















                (8) 
Thus, the two channels of the compatibility costs can be clearly 
separated. 
The following remark shows how the expected payoff of the firms 
I  depend on the compatibility costs. The payoff is easy to 
compute because in the mixed equilibrium the firms a ex ante 
indifferent between aggressive and compliant accounting. 
 
Compatibility costs put a burden on the firms unless there is a full 
honesty:   cqtI   1=  
Comparative statics 
irstly, we are interested in how the equilibrium value of 
cheating depends on the compatibility costs. For 0> LLqq
 , 
from (5) we have  
  ,=21 Qdqdcq                                                                                     (9) 
         
   
  .21
1
1
:= cts
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aapqapap
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q
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
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




                                                                                                                     (10) 
On the lhs we see the direct effect of c  on the costs of evasion: 
When there are more compliant firms ( 1/2)<q , the effect is 
positive, as there is a higher chance to meet a compliant firm and 
incur the compatibility costs. Otherwise ( 1/2)>q , the effect is 
negative, as there is a higher chance to meet a firm with 
aggressive accounting. 
On the rhs we see the indirect effect of c  on the benefits of 
evasion through changing q . The effect is more intricate and can 
be divided into three terms. The first term is a positive differential 
in auditing probability for similar and different reports. Indeed, 
with higher q  there is a lower chance to submit different reports, 
so the evading firms can enjoy lower auditing probability (“ 
differential probability” effect). The second term reflects the 
negative effect of q  on the attractiveness of evasion through 
raising auditing probability for both types of the reports (“ 
auditing change” effect). The third term is positive and reflects 
the increase in benefits from evasion through saving on 
compatibility costs (“ saving”  effect). 
Thus, the total indirect effect is ambiguous. Note that this is true not 
only for compatibility costs, but for any parameter affecting q , 
since it is actually change in q  itself that either increases or 
decreases attractiveness of evasion depending on how responsive 
the auditing probability is. This in turn depends on the curvature of 
the auditing function (we see  ap'  directly in (9), in appendix we 
show that 
qa
 depends on  ap '' ). As  ap'  is decreasing in q  
with      0</2 qaqap'  , the effect of the auditing change is 
most likely to outweigh other effects for small q , and visa versa. 
Because of strict monotonicity and   1p , auditing functions 
satisfy   0='p . So, the auditing change effect evaporates for 
large q , and the total effect becomes positive. 
For the class of functions with   =0'p , 0== 00 HLLL qq  and 
the auditing change effect grows unboundedly large at zero, 
whereas the lhs is bounded, so the total effect is certainly 
negative. Thus, for such functions there is a threshold value of 
equilibrium share of cheaters 
cq , below which the total indirect 
effect is negative (and hence 0</dcdq  for  cqq 1/2,min< ), 
and above which the total indirect effect is positive (and hence 
0</dcdq  for  cqq 1/2,max> ). 
We also note that the differential probability effect is reinforced 
by profit correlation more than the auditing change effect, so the 
total is more likely to be negative with lower correlation. At the 
extreme of independent draws we shall have 
    ,21= ctsaapQ q
'    
which is negative, if compatibility costs are small.8 
If the equilibrium is at the intersection when only inconsistent 
reports are audited, that is 00 << LLHL qqq
 , we have 
  dqQdcq 0=21                                                                                    (11) 
         ctsaapqapQ HLqHL'HL 211:=0    
We can see the play of all effects described above also here. The 
differential probability is represented by  HLap  and the auditing 
change effect is weakened, because the similar reports are not 
audited. We know that close to 0
HLq
 the total effect is negative, as 
   0=0HLHL qap . With higher q  the differential probability 
effect kicks in and the auditing change effect is less pronounced, 
so that the total may even change its sign. 
Second, we are interested in the effect of correlation on the 
equilibrium share of firms that use aggressive accounting. For an 
equilibrium with non-zero auditing of both report combinations9, 
we have  
,= QdqDd                                                                                                  (12) 
         
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  
  ts
qapap
aapqaapq
D
LLHL
HLHL'LLLL'












1
1
11
:=
   (13) 
The direct effect of the correlation on the costs of evasion is 
always positive (the last term in D ). It increases in the probability 
differential and the share of compliant firms. Intuitively, with 
higher correlation different reports are more likely, other things 
being equal. And since different reports are more likely to be 
detected and punished than similar, expected fine increases in 
profit correlation. The indirect effect of the correlation through 
auditing probability is represented by the first two terms in the 
expression for D . The first term is a negative effect through the 
decrease in auditing of similar reports ( 0<LLa
), the second term 
is a positive effect through the increase in auditing of different 
reports ( 0>HLa ). 
Here we can observe that for small q  the negative effect 
becomes small, whereas for large q  the positive effects vanish. 
The total effect of correlation on q  depends then on the indirect 
effect discussed at length above. For example, for auditing 
functions satisfying Inada conditions 0</drdq  for both very 
small and very large q . 
                                           
8 For sufficiently large compatibility costs the total effect is positive, but 
this is most likely to be irrelevant, as we are not sure about existence and 
uniqueness of the equilibrium under consideration. 
9 The sign of the expression does not change if only high-low report 
combinations are audited. 
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Third, we would like to see how an improvement in auditing 
technology affects the equilibrium. Consider a new auditing 
technology     0>,=1 kakpap . Then  
,= 1dqQKdk                                                                                                 (14) 
        
      
  .1
1
1
:= 

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aakpqapq
aakpqapq
K
HL
k
HL'HL
LL
k
LL'LL












         (15) 
where 1Q  is a correspondingly adjusted version of Q  that takes 
into account k . As expected, the direct effect of an improvement 
in auditing on the costs of evasion is positive: the same effort of 
the tax authority results in higher expected fine for a firm. The 
indirect effect is negative: with more effective auditing the 
optimal auditing effort is reduced, so the expected fine goes 
down as well. The total effect K  depends on the size of  ap '' : 
If  kp  is concave, the direct effect is higher than the indirect 
one, so the total effect of an improvement in auditing on the 
evasion costs is positive; the opposite is true for convex  kp . 
The effect through equilibrium cheating 1Q  is not affected much, 
as both differential probability and auditing change effects are 
amplified to the same extent, only the compatibility effect 
becomes relatively less important. Then with Inada conditions and 
positive K , 0</dkdq  for cqq < , 0>/dkdq
  for cqq > , that is 
improvement in auditing technology reduces cheating in low 
evasion regimes and enhances it in high evasion regimes. 
Fourth, we look at the fine. In our model the cheating is not 
necessarily decreasing in the surcharge rate s . The deterrence 
effect depends again on whether an increase in q  curbs or 
boosts benefits of evasion, i.e. on the sign of Q :  
            .=11 Qdqdstqapqqapq HLLL     (16) 
With Inada conditions that means 0</dsdq  for cqq < , 
0>/dsdq  for cqq > . 
We define the measure of effectiveness of the fine as the 
absolute value of the derivative of the equilibrium cheating 
ds
dq . 
We immediately see that this measure is decreasing in 
compatibility costs, so the fines loosen their grip with higher costs 
in our equilibrium. This is important to have in mind while 
formulating a tax/enforcement/accounting policy. 
Conclusion 
he compliance game with costs of accounting compatibility 
between transacting firms or monitored parties is 
considered in this paper. We show that when compatibility 
costs are small, there is a unique stable equilibrium10 with a 
positive share of non-compliant firms and a positive share of 
audited reports. When the costs are large, there may be multiple 
equilibria, in some of which either everybody or nobody complies. 
The game yields the insights that are impossible to obtain within 
the representative agent framework. Firstly, the monitoring 
authority should put more effort in auditing parties that did not 
coordinate their compliance decision, if it maximizes its expected 
revenue. Second, the compatibility costs may affect the extent of 
compliance in the opposite directions depending on what the 
auditing technology and the equilibrium share of noncompliance 
are. If there are many non-compliant agentss, the compatibility 
                                           
10 The uniqueness is guaranteed under mild technical assumption 
presented in the appendix. 
costs are more likely to increase noncompliance, and visa versa. In 
the application to tax avoidance, the correlation of taxpayer 
profit affects equilibrium in a similar way. Third, the effect of the 
fines and auditing technology on equilibrium values crucially 
depends on the prevailing reporting standard. When most of the 
firms use an aggressive standard, an increase in fines or auditing 
effectiveness may have an adverse effect on compliance. 
There is a number of policy recommendations arising from our 
analysis. Firstly, compatibility costs reduction efforts are only 
justified for economies (or industries) with substantial shadow 
sector. Such efforts include simplified accounting (exogenous 
costs) and little interest in the business links (endogenous costs 
through auditing probability differential). Second, the marginal 
increases in fines may be dangerous in economies or industries 
with low levels of compliance. Third, compatibility costs 
enhancement may be a sensible strategy for high compliance 
countries, and it may even be financed by eventual reduction in 
enforcement costs. 
We hope that our paper opens up a whole pile of issues that could 
not be addressed by the literature before. How do the links 
between managers of transacting firms affect their decision to 
comply with regulations, e.g. to pay taxes? How are these links 
taken into account by the monitoring authority? Could the 
government change the structure of these links for the benefit of 
the whole society? We cannot answer these questions in a far too 
simplified setting of transacting pairs we have here. However, 
what we can do is to say that the equilibrium behavior of the 
agents is affected significantly by the links between them, that it 
is affected through the costs of behaving differently, and it is 
affected in the direction of harmonization of this behavior. 
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Appendices 
A - Proof of Lemma 1 
The expected revenue of the auditor is  
        tqqtqtq  111 2  (17) 
       tqqaps HL  11  (18) 
      HLaqqq  11   
       tqqaps LL  21  
   LLaqq   2122  
Here the first term is the revenue from the firms that have high profits and do not evade (they are of measure  21 q ). The second group of 
3 term is the revenue from the mixed reports: the high reports bringing t  are of measure     qqq  11  , and low reports bringing 
in the fine are  qq 1 . Correspondingly, the costs of auditing must be subtracted for these cases. Finally, the last terms are the revenue from 
low reports and costs of auditing them. The same fine is levied in the cases of two firms or only one firm misreporting. 
Rearranging and taking first order conditions with respect to LLa  and 
HLa  gives  
           0,=1111:  tapsqqqqqa HL'HL   
         0.=2121: 22   qqaptsqqa LL'LL  
Working this out, we arrive at 
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where the equality holds for 0>a . In this case we can show that      qapqap LL'HL' < , as  
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



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  
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1
=
2


tsqq 
  
which is positive for any positive correlation and zero for independent draws. Note also that the difference is decreasing and convex in q , so 
     0</2 qaqap'  ,      0>/ 23 qaqap'  . 
Under concavity assumption second order conditions are trivially satisfied and    qaqa LLHL > . Our intuition is confirmed: low reports paired 
with high reports are audited more intensively than those paired with low reports. 
Note though that because    =lim 0 qg
HL
q
, there may also be a corner solution. Indeed, for any auditing function  :ap  
   <lim 0 ap
'
a
 there will be a corner solution. Formally, for all such functions     00 0==:0> HL
LLHL
HL qqqaqaq  . By construction it 
is also true that      0000 ,0=>:> LLHLLLHLHLLL qqqqaqaqq  . These threshold values can be found from the auditing function. For the 
different reports we have  
 
  
.
110
1/
=0




tsp
q
'HL
 
For the similar reports the threshold value f the share of firms with aggressive accounting is implicitly defined by  
          .21110=21 020   tsqqtsp LLLL'  
Since 10 0  HLq , if     tsp
' 11/<0 , tax authority will never audit, as the marginal revenue from audit is negative. Furthermore, if 
     tsp' 1/<0 , the best response function is degenerate with   0qa ; if       /11/1<0  tsp' , the similar reports are 
never audited:   0qaLL . 
Thus, both best responses (for mixed and similar reports) of the tax autority are weakly increasing continuous functions of q . 
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B - Proof of proposition 2 
To show that  qp ,  is indeed a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need 1) 
p  is a best response of tax authority given the belief about q ; 2) each 
firm plays best response to p  and the share of cheating firms q ; 3) the belief of the authority is consistent with equilibrium play of the firms. 
For 1) we need (??) and (1); for 2) in a mixed equilibrium it is sufficient that each firm is indifferent between cheating and honesty given that the 
partner is cheating with probability q :  
   CuAu =  
or  
             =1,,1, cqLLuHLuqLLqu    
           qcLHuHHuqLHqu  ,,1,   
Rearranging, we get 
               .111=21  tsapqapqcqbt HLLL   (19) 
Note that this expression depends on q  unlike in the benchmark case, so we cannot present the resulting equilibrium explicitly. However, the 
two sides of the equation admit quite a straightforward intuitive explanation. The lhs is the benefit from evasion net of accounting costs b  
and coordination costs c . The rhs is the expected cost of fines in two types of matches: two low reports and high-low reports. Both costs and 
benefits of evasion increase with q . The higher population share of evaders relieves the coordination problem for a firm that chose aggressive 
accounting. At the same time, higher share of wrong reports calls for more auditing thus increasing expected fine. 
 Formally, from the properties of best response functions    qaqa HLLL ,  we can see that rhs of (19) is weakly monotonically increasing in q . 
Namely, it is zero for 0
HLqq  , it is        tsqapq HL  11  for  00 , LLHL qqq , and it is the full expression for 0LLqq   converging to 
        tsapq LL  11  as q  approaches unity. We know that  qp'a  is convex (we can directly compute second derivatives). We 
also know that  'app  is decreasing, but we did not impose anything on its convexity/concavity. Now,  qp  can be written as   qpp 'a . It 
is increasing, and it is also concave if  'app  is not too convex. Thus, rhs is concave under a mild ansumption on the third derivative of the 
function  ap . 
At 0
LLq , the left derivative of rhs is             tsqapqapq LLHLLLHLqLL  11 000 , the right derivative has an additional term 
            tsqapqapq LLLLLLLLqLL  11 000 , which is positive. 
Lhs is linearly increasing in q  with the slope c2 , starting with   cbt  . The intersection(s) define Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Because of a 
jump in the derivative of rhs at 0
LLq
, we may have up to 6 intersections (with up to 3 locally stable equilibria). However, the more interesting 
case for us is the stable unique equilibrium, which indeed results for small values of c , if either         01 000  LLHLLLHLqLL qapqapq  or 
        tsqapqbt LLHLLL  11 00  or          qapqtsbt HL
LL
q
HL
qq 



 1max1 0,0  . At the limit of no coordination costs, the 
equilibrium is defined by one of the conditions             sapqapqtb HLLL  111=/1   or       sapqtb HL  11=/1  , 
depending on the auditing technology. Namely, the first happens, if            tsqapqcqbt LLHLLLLL  11>21 000 , and the second 
otherwise. 
This equilibrium is unique and stable. By continuity, the same is true for small values of c . 
Note that with increase of c  lhs simply rotates around horizontal line given by   bt  . It retains this value at 0.5=q , while going down by 
c  at 0=q  and up by c  at 1=q . This immediately leads us to the following corollary: 
With 1/2=q , the effect of coordination costs is completely neutralized.  
This is very intuitive: when the two populations are balanced, there is neither potential gain nor loss in terms of coordination from playing 
either strategy. 
Note that the equilibrium will only be stable, if at the intersection the slope of the evasion costs (rhs) exceeds the slope of the benefits from 
evasion (lhs). Thus, stability requires the following condition to be satisfied: 
                    ,111<2  tsqapqapqqapqapqc LLLLqHLHLq    
where q  is the equilibrium share of the firms that employ aggressive accounting. 
If there is no stable interior equilibrium, the full cheating is stable. A general condition for existence of full cheating equilibrium is    CuAu   
given 1=q . This can be rewritten, similarly to (19), as  
      ,11  tsapcbt LL    (20) 
with       tsap LL' 11/=1 . 
Full honesty may also be an option, if the auditing is cheap or payment for evasion high. A general condition for the existence of full honesty 
euilibrium is    CuAu   given 0=q . This can be rewritten as  
  0. cbt   
However, this equilibrium is globally stable only if  
    0.21 0  cqbt HL   (21) 
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C - comparative statics results 
By inverse function theorem  
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